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We address this deficiency by developing and assessing a to detect and remediate devices that violate the policies of the mechanism for detecting misbehaving nodes in wireless systems.
While we developed our system on an 802.11 network, the same network approach could readily be applied to other wireless networks.
In this paper, we describe a Misbehaving Node Detection Our mechanism is based on a reputation-enabled intrusion detec-(MIND) mechanism, which integrates policy, detection, and tion system, in which a centralized trust authority monitors traffic and collects secondhand information on potentially misbehaving remediation components for ldentifying and handling misnodes. The system integrates a mixture of alarms and reports configured, misbehaving, or malicious devices. In designing to calculate a reputation vector of all nodes in the system. An this system, we identified five key issues our system should XML based policy engine is used to detect policy violations. address. These mechanisms are built to be flexible and extensible in order to deal with the issues arising out of software programmable 1) The system should provide a policy based mechanism devices. In extending beyond traditional intrusion detection, our for identifying misconfigured, misbehaving, and maliapproach will incorporate physical layer information, such as cious nodes. power and frequency use, in determining improper behavior.
2) The system should be able to detect and remediate nodes
In evaluating the system, we consider how our mechanism, 1) impacts system performance, 2) correctly identifies misbehaving that violate policy. nodes, 3) addresses "bad mouthing" and 4) resists collusion.
3) The system should be flexible and sufficiently extensible to handle common [1] Such adaptations could readily all members are initially trusted and can be authenticated using lead to devices operating in a way that violates expected public key cryptography [3] , and messages are protected by protocol behavior. strong confidentiality, integrity and availability mechanisms.
While many networks implement strong mechanisms for The system is assumed to have one fully trusted centralized confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, some of the most node that monitors wireless traffic using wireless snort [4] , disconcerting issues arise from authenticated and trusted de-an open source wireless Intrusion Detection System (IDS), vices that are misconfigured or fall into the hands of a misbe-and also aggregates secondhand reports from nodes in the having or malicious user. Examples of misconfigured devices network concerning other nodes that are misbehaving or acting maliciously.
B. Reputation Systems An XML based policy engine is used to detect policy A large portion of previous work in reputation systems has violations including DoS and active attacks against the net-focused on the area of peer-to-peer [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , multiwork. Detection policies are transformed into wireless snort hop wireless networks [10] We assume that all nodes in the system are initially trusted (IDS) that uses a flexible rule based detection architecture to and authenticated using public key cryptography. Over time, identify intrusions in networks. The core Snort IDS currently nodes may continue to behave properly, or they may become supports wired networks exclusively. Wireless Snort [4] is an misconfigured, misbehaving, or malicious. The misconfigured extension for the Snort IDS that adds support for IEEE 802.11 and misbehaving nodes may attempt to correct their behavior wireless frames. Wireless Snort allows for 802.11 specific either on their own or when the centralized authority sends detection rules through a new "WiFi" rule protocol. As we them a remediation notice. (Of course, some nodes may not demonstrate in Section 3, the extended rule set proved to be be able to change their behavior because of hardware or sufficiently flexible to allow for a combination of automated software problems). Malicious nodes are likely to continue and manual translations of policies written in XML into rules to violate the policy of the network even after receiving a for detecting policy violations.
remediation notice from the centralized authority. centralized authority that is trusted at all times and does not D. Detection misbehave in any way.
As shown in Figure 3 , the centralized authority implements the bad behavior detection mechanism through the use of a snort engine that combines firsthand and secondhand informa-
We assume that all nodes have the public key of the tion. The firsthand information is gathered by the centralized centralized authority and the centralized authority has the authority. The secondhand information is gathered by the agpublic keys of all the nodes in the system. It is assumed that the gregation system that also runs on the centralized authority and system uses strong confidentiality, integrity, and availability accepts reports of misbehavior from other nodes in the system. algorithms to protect the system from non-member nodes. Both Our system includes negative feedback and forgiveness
The detection rules define network policies and expected mechanisms in the trust metric calculation. The policy defuser behavior. All detection rules include a mechanism for initions include a reputation decrease value for all of the decreasing a node's reputation due to policy violations. Some alarms generated by the detection system. Nodes are assumed alarms (i.e., captured violation events) contain additional pa-to be trusted in our system and start with a reputation rameters. For example, the MessageLimit tag includes two value of one. The computation for a node's reputation is additional tags that define how many messages in a fixed time one minus an exponentially weighted sum of the reputation period constitute a DoS attack. Example detection rules are decrease value for every alarm detected by the node locally shown in Figure 1 .
(as shown in algorithm 1). This equation forgives nodes for
In order for network policies to be meaningful there must be past misbehavior over time and when an alarm is 24 hours defined consequences for misbehavior. The remediation tags old, it is removed by both the local node and the central include a reputation threshold, whereby if a node's reputation authority. The exponential weight of 0.82 was selected to falls below this threshold the remediation action is taken by give a smooth weighting throughout the 24 hour period. This the centralized authority. Example remediation rules are shown exponential weight will have a value of 0.008 after 24 hours in Figure 2 .
thus approching a value close to zero. The policies for the network in our experiments were 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 configured such that misconfigured nodes were given a chance Minutes to reform before being removed from the system. Thus it Fig. 6 . Three malicious nodes launch a bad mouthing attack against three took longer to remove malicious nodes. The policies could be correctly behaving nodes defined such that the network is more aggressive at removing nodes. This would remove malicious nodes from the system faster; however, this would also cause some misconfigured As Figure 5 shows, the malicious nodes where detected and nodes to be removed before they are given a chance to when remediation attempts were ignored they were removed reform their behavior. We set our threshold policies to remove from the network after 58 minutes. The misconfigured nodes malicious nodes within a 60 minute interval. This was an were instructed to reboot after 43 minutes and began to arbitrary selection and could have been set at 60 seconds.
behave correctly. Once the misconfigured nodes corrected their behavior, their reputation began to increase through the A. Performance forgiveness mechanism implicit in the trust computation. This Overall, the MIND system is extremely lightweight with the shows that the MIND system can correctly distinguish between centralized authority responsible for the majority of the work. misconfigured nodes that correct their behavior and malicious The message overhead of the MIND system was minimal and nodes that continue to misbehave (and therefore must be consisted of the centralized authority sending ten messages removed from the network).
(one for every peer in the system) every five minutes to distribute the global trust vector. These messages are small in C. Bad Mouthing Attack size consisting of only 20 bytes of payload data plus additional A common attack against reputation systems is for one or protocol overhead. The secondhand reports are also compact more colluding nodes to disseminate false negative informa-(4 bytes of payload). The trust computations are lightweight, tion about honest nodes in order to decrease the honest node's with the bulk of the computational work being performed by reputation. This attack was studied in [21] and referred to as the centralized authority, while the nodes are only required to a "bad mouthing attack." combine the global and local reputation vectors.
To analyze how MIND handles bad mouthing attacks, we configured the network to have seven well-behaving nodes B. Mixed Misconfigured and Malicious Nodes and three colluding malicious nodes. These colluding nodes
In the first attack scenario, we configured two nodes to were configured to launch a bad mouthing attack against three behave as if they were misconfigured and two nodes to honest nodes. The malicious nodes were also configured to behave maliciously. The misconfigured nodes sent messages violate network policies and provided bad information 50% with bad checksums until ordered to reboot by the centralized of the time to the targeted honest nodes and to ignore all authority. The malicious nodes violated a number of network remediation instructions from the centralized authority. policies and did not comply with the centralized authority's
As the results in Figure 6 show this test ran for two hours remediation requests.
and 18 minutes before all malicious nodes where detected and is targeted at creating a secure routing protocol for multi-hop wireless networks. Most online auction sites have implemented a reputation reputation scores reached the threshold to be removed from system. By far the most popular and widely used trustthe system. At first, the bad mouthing attack was partially management system is eBay's user feedback system. It uses a successful at lowering the reputation of the honest nodes. centralized server to collect feedback and display trust scores However, as the centralized authority detected the misbehavior of other users. The data is readily available to the public and of the malicious nodes, it began to discount the secondhand aids buyers and sellers in determining when to trust someone. reports from these malicious nodes. Since the centralized An interesting analysis of eBay's reputation system was done authority did not detect any firsthand misbehavior from the by P. Resnick and R. Zeckhauser [22] . correctly behaving nodes, it began to weight the correctly The NICE scheme is a trust inference mechanism targeted behaving nodes secondhand reports higher than the malicious for peer-to-peer networks [8] . There are two components to node's reports. This resulted in the bad mouthing attack failing the trust inference: local knowledge from past dealings and and the malicious nodes being removed from the system. a mechanism to query other trusted members of the system The weighting of secondhand reports by the firsthand in-for secondhand information about a node. The system also formation of the centralized authority proved to be effective includes virtual currency in the form of cookies generated after even though the centralized authority could not detect all of successful transactions to record direct trust between peers. the malicious node's misbehavior.
Sonja Buchegger and Jean-Yves Le Boudec designed a distributed reputation system [6] , in which the secondhand D. DDoS Attack reputation rating is accepted only when it is close to the current For our final experiment, we analyzed how the MIND reputation rating. The system has a stipulation that secondhand system dealt with a number of colluding nodes launching a information that deviates too much from the current rating Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. We configured is ignored; thereby improving the robustness of the system three nodes to behave maliciously by violating the message against bad mouth attacks and reputation inflation by malicious limit policy of the network. The nodes attempted to evade nodes. detection by other nodes in the network by only sending 399 The EigenTrust algorithm [16], uses both positive and messages during a 30 minute interval to every other node in the negative firsthand and secondhand feedback to capture a peer's system. This resulted in the malicious nodes sending a total of reputation. The algorithm computes a score by taking the 2793 messages per a half hour. Since the malicious nodes did number of positive transactions divided by the total number of not send more than 399 messages to any individual member transactions with the peer. The scores are normalized over all of the network, no secondhand reports of DoS attacks were peers in the system to provide the relative trust of every node sent to the centralized authority. However, as shown in Figure in the network. EigenTrust is fully distributed using a DHT-7, the centralized authority witnessed the attacks firsthand and overlay network. The MIND algorithm for computing trust the reputation of the malicious nodes fell sufficiently that they scores borrows from equations described in the EigenTrust were removed from the network within one hour and seventeen paper. minutes.
The DICAS protocol [12] , is a lightweight method for F. Evaluation Conclusions detecting malicious nodes in multi-hop wireless networks.
It can detect wormhole, Sybil, and rushing attacks from These results show that the hybrid detection mechanism is malicious nodes in the network. It also includes a secure effective at detecting attacks; arguably more effective than neighbor discovery and authentication algorithm. DICAS also a purely centralized or purely distributed mechanism. Also, defines LSR (Lightweight Secure Routing), which is built on our evaluation shows that the trust computation can resist top of the DICAS protocol and is meant to enable nodes to active attacks against the MIND system by correctly weighting route around malicious nodes. The MIND system assumes a secondhand reports based on firsthand knowledge of the node. small single-hop network of authenticated nodes and therefore As we previously indicated, the policies can be altered to allow avoids the multi-hop routing issues.
None of the systems mentioned above discuss the policy [ 
